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THE TEXAN-SANTA FE EXPEDITION OF 1841

CHARLES R. MCCLURE

IN

1841 New Mexico was a frontier department plagued by
foreign encroachments, Indian depredations, and unpatriotic
citizens. At least this was the situation as seen by Governor and
Commandant General Manuel Armijo. The Santa Fe Trail had
brought not only substantial profits to New Mexico but also many
foreigners who were constant trouble for the governor. The
Navajo, Apache, Comanche, and Ute were virtually unchecked
along the frontier, and there was widespread killing and huge
property loss. Worse, there was the fear that many Mexicans were
sympathetic to Texan and American schemes of annexation. In
this maze of problems, Armijo in 1840 received reports of an impending invasion by the rebellious Texans. As governor of New
Mexico, Armijo had the responsibility to defend and preserve the
Department for Mexico.
Perhaps the best known account of the Texan-Santa Fe expedition is Narrative of the Texan-Santa Fe Expedition by George
Wilkins Kendall, a journalist who accompanied it. His account
and other personal recollections by Thomas Falconer, Franklin
Combs, and Cayton Erhard are one-sided accounts exhibiting the
well-known Anglo prejudice against the New Mexicans. Later
relation of the expedition by such historians as Hubert Howe
Bancroft, Ralph Emerson Twitchell, and William Binkley give
more credible accounts employing both Mexican and Texan
sources. In The Texan Santa Fe Pioneers Noel M. Loomis provides the most extensive account of the expedition. As the title
indicates, however, Loomis concludes that the Texans were en-

46

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLVIII: 1 1973

gaged in a peaceful trade mission and that the New Mexicans were
treacherous in their dealings with them. 1
Information contained in the Mexican Archives of New Mexico
and the Huntington Library indicates that historians should reevaluate the role that the New Mexicans played in the TexanSanta Fe expedition. These sources show that Governor Manuel
Armijo was not the bumbling incompetent despot that some writers
have pictured. Rather, he was a pragmatic administrator caught
amidst the ambitions of the United States and the Republic of
Texas, an unconcerned national government in Mexico City,
numerous hostile Indian tribes which periodically· rampaged the
Department, and financial instability that hamstrung all operations of government. In the face of these crises, Governor Armijo
successfully defended the Department of New Mexico from the
Texan invaders.
Little attempt at secrecy concerning the expedition was made
by President Mirabeau B. Lamar of Texas. Newspapers in Austin
and St. Louis carried accounts of the proposed journey. After
months of hesitation, the expedition left Texas on June 20, 1841,2
for the purpose of extending control over Texan domain as interpreted from the Treaty of Velasco of May 14, 1836. (Article 3 of
which stated that Mexican control was to extend only to the area
south of the Rio Grande del Norte, all lands north belonging to
the Territory of Texas). Also-paradoxically-they hoped to establish peaceful commercial relations with the Mexicans. In preparing the expedition, Lamar previously had sent trader William
G. Dryden to Santa Fe in 1840 to further Texan interests. On
March 10, 184 I, Dryden reported:
. . . every American, and more than two thirds of the Mexicans, and
all of the Pueblo Indians are with us heart and soul; and whenever
they have heard of your sending troops, there had been rejoicing;
and indeed I have talked many times with the governor, and he says
he would be glad to see the day of your arrival in' this country, as he
feels well-assured that no aid· will be sent from below....3
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If the purpose of the expedition was to establish commercial relations 4 it is interesting to note the emphasis placed on the sending
of troops, not merchants. Dryden's observations appear to be more
Texan exaggeration than fact. His statement that he had conferred many times with the governor is not substantiated by the
governor's papers. Furthermore, while there was some discontent
on the part of a few New Mexicans it was not as great as Dryden
reported. 5
Nonetheless, with false information such as this and with prospects of territorial and economic gain, this legally unauthorized expedition of three hundred and twenty men under the command of
Colonel Hugh McLeod departed for Santa Fe. The actual journey
was one of poor leadership and and extreme hardship. Personal
accounts of the trek thoroughly discuss the starvation, Indian raids,
and undisciplined troops. The men in the expedition had little
knowledge of the desert they were about to cross. The originally
expected five hundred miles to Santa Fe became more than one
thousand after backtracking and misdirection. The expedition left
too late in the year to find adequate grass and water. This
"merchant caravan"-as the newspapers termed it-included two
hundred and seventy troops and approximately fifty merchants,
along with one brass howitzer. The group had more men than
necessary to fend off the Indians, yet too few to attack a foreign
nation. 6
Although New Mexico was removed from main communication
lines, news of the invasion filtered in to Armijo. In March 1840
Armijo was informed that approximately five hundred Texans
were on the way to Taos. 7 While this report proved to be false, it
does show that the governor had the necessary time to prepare for
the Texans. In his correspondence with the Mexican Minister of
War, Armijo gives an accurate account of the events leading to the
actual arrival <?f the Texans in September and October of 184 I.
"". Armijo's concern over the. expected invasion is clearly evident.
By June I 8Ljhhe rhad become. alarmed by the attitude of some New
Mexicans: 'fMany of the people expect better conditions from the
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Texans and thus refuse to help defend this land."s Perhaps he
overstated his position in order to receive aid from the central
government, but he did have definite cause for concern. Since the
opening of trade with the United States in 1821, the people had
looked more to the north for goods and supplies, than to the south. 9
The constant theme running through Armijo's letters to the
Minister of War was the need for more troops. When it became
apparent that troops would not be sent simply because of a
threatened Texan attack, Armijo resorted to forwarding reports
about revolutionaries in the Department and Indian attacks in the
surrounding areas. In July 1840 Armijo reported that he had just
concluded an unfavorable treaty with the Navajo because he could
not make war against them with so few troopS.lO In another letter,
dated July 12, Armijo reported that only the priests could be
trusted to be patriotic. l1 Although there doubtless was dissatisfaction in New Mexico, Armijo's contention that the populace was
ready to rebel is not substantiated by other documents for that year.
A better explanation might be that the governor was using all possible methods to obtain troops. At worst the inhabitants were
apathetic, not rebellious.
It is true that the troops under Armijo's command were not in
good condition. The presidio in Santa Fe could list but 107 men in
March 1840, and the militia was in worse shape. Records show
that many men who on paper were in the militia actually did not
serve. Within the jurisdiction of Santa Fe, the muster rolls show
526 men as part of the militia. Of this number only thirty-four
were categorized as can armas en mana (with arms in hand). This
condition was the rule for other jurisdictions such as San Juan,
Rio Abajo, Albuquerque, and Cochiti. Although the army appeared quite powerful on paper, it had little actual strength. 12
The military suffered from paucity of supplies and poor equipment. After Mexican Independence, the Spanish system for supplying the troops had been maintained. With payments one month
to one year behind schedule, scant financial assistance from Mexico
City, and inadequate training of the soldiers, it is a wonder that
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the troops performed as well as they did. 13 The arrangement by
which the soldiers had to maintain their equipment at their own
expense made effective armament difficult. Armijo tried to maintain frequent inspections, to no avail. 14 A typical reply concerning
payment of troops from the Minister of vVar to Armijo was that
sufficient funds had been provided, and he was to fight the barbarians and to make do with what he had. Hi The official must have
become somewhat piqued at Armijo's constant requests, for the
following day he wrote that less correspondence from Armijo
would save paper and considerable expense to the government. 16
Losing hope of receiving assistance from Mexico City, while
reports concerning the Texan invasion continued, Armijo was
forced to rally his people to the defense of the country. In a proclamation on July 16, 1840, the governor warned the citizens of the
approaching Texan rebels. He asked whether the people were will~
ing to be reduced to slavery, whether they would allow the destruction of their religion, and whether they would fight for their
beloved country. Following this appeal to patriotism he ordered
the following:
.
Any man over sixteen years of age, upon hearing news of an
attack on the departmental frontiers is immediately ordered to
report to the nearest political or military authority with his arms.
2. No person shall leave the department for the area held by the
enemy for any reason whatsoever.
3. No person is to supply the enemy with articles of war or give any
form of aid to them.
4. Foreigners who are naturalized citizens have the same obligations
as Mexicans of natural birth. Foreigners not naturalized shall
observe complete neutrality.
5. Those persons who fail to observe these declared ordinances of
the law will be punished to the full extent of the law without
remission .17
1.

In this proclamation the governor's tone was both patriotic and
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forceful. He could not fight a war without support from his countrymen, and it was his duty as governor and commandant general
to rally the people to the defense of New Mexico.
Although, with the passing of September 1840, Armijo realized
that a Texan expedition would not arrive that year, he became
more convinced that Texan conspirators were already in New
Mexico. During October 1840 a plot to assassinate Armijo was discovered in Santa Fe. Nothing of substance was proved in the trial
of Julian Garda and Tomas Valencia except that they strongly
disliked the policies of Armijo and wanted to kill him. Judging
from the questions that the civil authorities asked these two men,
it appears that the court thought they were in the service of Texas,
but nothing was proved except their guilt. IS
In the early months of 184 I Armijo continued his efforts to
strengthen his troops and to organize the militia. Recent reports
from the Comanche Indians told of having seen the T ejanos and
indicated that they would arrive in Santa Fe in the autumn.
Armijo was much alarmed fearing that the Texans would make an
alliance with the Comanche against the Mexicans. On June 3 he
notified the Minister of War that he needed troops and ammunition, hinting that the chance of a Comanche-Texan alliance was
now a definite possibility.19 By this time the Minister of War had
~~geived similar reports from other sources and promised help.
Orders came from Mexico City telling Armijo to defend New
Mexico at all costs. More important, troops and money would be
sent to him for use as he saw fit. Finally, a well-organized plan of
defense against the Texans was drawn up. Armijo would, maintain
his forces along the eastern frontier, guarding against Indi~h unrest and advance parties from Texas. Francisco Garda Conde
governor of Chihuahua, woud bring fresh troops and ammunition
as soon as possible. The Minister of War wrote that it would be
best to meet the Texans before they entered any populated areas,
inasmuch as the patriotism of the people was still in question.
Above all, Armijo was not to enter into any relations or agreements with the Texan rebels but was to obtain their immediate
surrender. 20
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While authorities organized policy outside. the department,
Armijo was not idle in establishing a plan within. New Mexico.
Trusted friends and officials \\;ere given specific duties: Antonio
Sandoval was to watch for Indian trouble in the north; Vicar Juan
Ortiz was to arouse public spirit in support of the government;
Mariano Chavez was ordered to command the militia in Santa Fe; .
and scouting parties under Damasio Salazar and Santiago Ulibarri
were to guard the eastern frontier. In addition, one hundred pesos
were offered to any person supplying definite information about
the location of the Texans.21
Further complications developed when Armijo received reports
impugning the loyalty of two of his most trusted militia captains,
Juan Andres Archuleta and Felipe Sena. On August 5 these men
were investigated on suspicion of having knowledge of the enemy.
Although Archuleta was second in command of the departmental
armies, proceedings were initiated. Both defendants denied any
connection with the Texans or knowledge of their whereabouts.
Archuleta and Sena were exonerated, and Archuleta went to Taos
to command the militia. 22
Many foreigners in Santa Fe became concerned for their lives
and property in the event of an actual battle. In a letter to the
governor, dated September 14, Manuel Alvarez, United States
consul, demanded that foreigners in New Mexico be treated as
neutrals and that their property be respected. 23 Armijo replied,
"Citizens of .countries friendly to Mexico will be protected· and
respected in accordance with treaties in effect."24 Nevertheless,
when Armijo left the capital on September 16 to fight the Texans,
some irate Mexicans entered the Alvarez horne and gave him a
severe beating. Guadalupe Miranda, secretary to the governor, dispersed the rabble and apologized to Alvarez. 25
. By September 1841 Armijo was prepared. Citizens and spies
were on constant watch for the invaders, the militia had been
organized in Taos under Juan Archuleta, and, on September 16,
Antonio Sandoval arrived in Santa Fe to act as head of state while
Armijo led his forces to San Miguel. Half-starved, ragged and
weak, the Texans were in no shape to fight a war.
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Owing to the poor condition of many of the men in the expedition, on August 30, Colonel McLeod, at Camp Resolution, had
been obliged to divide the command:
However impolitic it may be considered to divide a command, in this
instance such a course could not be avoided. We were completely
lost, and without power of moving forward; our provisions ... were
now almost entirely exhausted, with only poor beef enough each day
to support nature; and in addition we were surrounded by a large and
powerful tribe of well-mounted Indians. 26

Captain William Cooke, with approximately one hundred of the
strongest men carrying provisions for only five days, was to march
ahead to San Miguel with the best animals. Colonel McLeod
would remain behind with the rest of the command and continue
as best he could. The five-day journey to San Miguel turned into
a two-week battle against starvation and Indians.
On September 16 an advance party of five Texans, including
George Kendall, was captured by Captain Damasio Salazar and
his command of sixty-eight Mexicans. Salazar later reported that
upon meeting the Texans he told them they could not enter the
Department without first removing their arms. After some consultation the Texans complied. Two of the captives, probably George
Kendall and William Lewis, demanded to see the governor, but
Salazar informed them that this could not be arranged at that time.
After conferring with his officers, Salazar decided that the Texans
were spies and should be executed. Had not Gregorio Vigil interceded and argued that only Governor Armijo had authority to
execute prisoners, all five Texans most certainly would have been
shot,27
Kendall's version is similar to Salazar's except for the personal
slurs against the Mexicans. 28 He did exaggerate the strength of
Salazar's force, which he places at over one hundred men. He also
wrote that Salazar was a most ignorant man, unable to read or
write. 29 This is impossible, for Salazar wrote complete reports to
Armijo.
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While the five Texan captives marched to San Miguel, Armijo
passed them going in the opposite direction. Armijo paused long
enough to express his need for an interpreter. William Lewis
stepped forward to offer his services and went back With Armijo to
meet the remainder of the Texans. On September 17 Salazar and
Lewis found the remainder of the Cooke party at Anton Chico.
Lewis told Captain Cooke that it would be futile to fight. Armijo
with three thousand men was only twelve hours away. After Lewis
pledged his Masonic word of honor that his fellow Texans would
not be taken prisoners, that they would receive food and be welltreated, Cooke ordered his men to lay down their arms. They were
immediately tied up and their property confiscated. The next
morning Armijo arrived with fifteen hundred men and held a
council of war to decide their fate. Franklin Combs, one of the
captives, later stated that the council decided by one vote not to
execute the prisoners. Within the next week the Cooke portion of
the expedition had begun its long, tedious march to Mexico City.30
Armijo then made his headquarters at Las Vegas and planned
his strategy for the capture of the McLeod party-still out on the
prairie. He ordered Juan Andres Archuleta and a small reconnaissance party to search for the Texans. Archuleta found them at
Laguna Colorada on October 4. He demanded immediate surrender, but McLeod asked for time to consult his companions. He
promised to reply at nine o'clock the next morning. During the
night Archuleta, who was well entrenched near the Texans, was
reinforced by sixty rurales from Taos. This brought his total
strength to 233 men. The Texans were now completely surrounded. McLeod had little choice and surrendered his command
of 172 weak, starved, and scurvy-ridden men. On October 6
Archuleta took the captives' cannon and arms, and the next day
these Texans also began their long march to Mexico City.3!
Armijo's success prompted public celebrations throughout New
Mexico. Proclamations offering Texan annexation of New Mexico
were burned. In an official proclamation to the inhabitants of the
Department, Armijo saluted and congratulated them for their
prowess in defeating the Texan bandits:
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You hesitated not one moment in taking arms when the country
called you to its defense.... The enemies of our national integrity,
who today by some mistake occupy the fertile territory of Texas,
and who tried to extend from there the limits of that territory ... ,
have metwith the intrepid and bellicose nature of the New Mexicans.
Be assured that with the perserverance and valor that you have
given our nation, no enemy will accomplish such depraved plots as
this. 32

While the hapless Texans marched some two thousand miles to
Mexico City, there to be imprisoned,33 Armijo was praised by the
federal government for a job well done.
In spite of the complete failure of the Santa Fe expedition of
184 I, talk in the Lone Star Republic of expansionistic expeditions
continued. Once the captives returned to Texas in 1842, plans
were made to retaliate against the so-called treachery of Armijo,
Salazar, and Lewis. In 1843 an expedition under the command of
Jacob Snively was commissioned for "intercepting and capturing
the property of the Mexican traders who may pass through the
territory of the Republic to and from Santa Fe."34 Some raids were
made, but the majority of the expedition returned to Texas when
Captain Philip St. George Cooke of the United States Army disarmed the band after they had crossed into United States
territory.35
.
Manuel Armijo viewed these Texans as enemies of the Mexican
nation. It would be unrealistic to conclude that the Mexican government had any other policy toward Texas at this time. Circulars
issued by the Mexican government to the diplomatic corps in
Mexico City reminded them of the state of war between Texas
and Mexico. 36 While apologists for the Texan-Santa Fe expedition may argue that New Mexico was part of Texas because of the
Treaty of Velasco, the Mexicans entertained no such belief. When
Governor Manuel Armijo found an armed body of Texans approaching New Mexico, he treated them as an invading army and
preserved the Department of New Mexico for the national government.
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